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We use firm-level data and national input-output tables from 17 countries over the 2002-2005 
period to test new and existing hypotheses about the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
on the efficiency of domestic firms in the host country (i.e. spillovers).  Providing evidence from 
a larger sample of countries and greater variety of firms than existing studies, with separate 
estimates by firm size, age, and sector, we show: a) backward spillovers (stemming from 
supplying a foreign firm in the host country or exporting to a foreign firm) are consistently 
positive; b) horizontal spillovers are mostly insignificant but positive for older firms and firms in 
the service sector; c) forward spillovers (from purchasing foreign firms or importing) are also 
positive only for old and service sector firms.  We find no support for the hypothesis that 
spillovers are greater for FDI with more advanced technology.  While efficiency of domestic 
firms’ is affected by the business environment, the strength of FDI spillovers is not, either when 
measured by the degree of corruption, bureaucratic red tape or by differences across regions that 
vary in terms of development.  Testing whether spillovers vary with the firm’s “absorptive 
capacity” we find: i) distance from the efficiency frontier tends to dampen horizontal spillovers 
in manufacturing and backward spillovers among old firms; ii) whereas firms with a larger share 
of university educated workforce are more productive, they do not enjoy greater FDI spillovers 
than firms with less educated workers.  FDI spillovers hence vary by sectors and types of firms. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the role of minimum wage legislation in reducing poverty in 
Honduras.  The justification for minimum wage legislation is to redistribute income to 
low wage workers.1  This policy tool can be especially important in developing countries 
during periods of rapid adjustment to the global economy.  However, in an era when 
global competition is very strong, several policy makers are arguing for reductions in 
(and even the abolition of) minimum wages (and other labor market regulation) in Latin 
America to allow for more labor market flexibility and increased competitiveness (see 
e.g., Heckman and Pages, 2003).  The main argument is that rigidities in the labor 
market, such as wage rigidity caused by the minimum wage, can slow down job creation 
and in turn contribute to unemployment and poverty (see e.g., Kowan, Micco and Pages 
2004).  On the other hand, fierce competition in the globalized world is also creating an 
environment that some have termed “the race to the bottom.”  This group is concerned 
that wages and working conditions are being driven down by global competition and 
there is a need to uphold the bottom with regulations such as the minimum wage and 
labor standards.  Acemoglu’s (2001) theoretical model, which shows that minimum 
wages can shift the composition of employment toward high-wage jobs, could be used in 
support of this latter view.  Hence, increases in minimum wages could contribute to the 
reduction of poverty by increasing the incomes of those affected by the legislation and 
perhaps even increasing the share of higher wage jobs in the economy. 
We take advantage of the enormous variation in the minimum wage structure of a 
relatively poor country to examine minimum wage effects on poverty during the 2001-
                                                 
1 See Freeman (1996) for an enlightened discussion of the minimum wage as a redistributive tool.  
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2004 period.2  Honduras has set over 22 minimum wages, by industry and firm size, for 
decades.  These legal minimum wages apply to all employees in the private sector, 
although we present evidence that they are complied with only in large private firms and 
not in small private firms.  There is also a large group of workers (the self-employed and 
public sector) for whom minimum wages do not apply directly, but whose wages and 
employment can be affected indirectly either through the mobility of workers across 
sectors in response to changes in the minimum wage or through institutions, such as 
unions, that try to emulate the minimum wage increase in their sector’s wages.  We 
combine micro data from the household surveys with data on minimum wages to 
determine whether increases in the minimum wage affect the probability that a typical 
individual in the labor force, as well as different types of workers in both the covered and 
uncovered sectors are poor.  
We find that minimum wage increases do reduce extreme poverty: A 10% 
increase in the minimum wage will reduce the probability that an average individual in 
the labor force is in extreme poverty by 1.8% (i.e., from 44.0% to 43.2%) and in poverty 
by 1.0% (although this latter finding is close to but not statistically significant by 
conventional levels).  These results are driven entirely by the effect on workers in large 
private sector firms, where a 10% increase in the minimum wage reduces extreme 
poverty and poverty by 2.0% and 1.9%, respectively.  Increases in the minimum wage do 
not seem to affect the net probability of being poor for individuals employed or 
previously employed in a small firm, or as self-employed or in the public sector. 
 
                                                 
2 The period of analysis is circumscribed by the fact that micro data on poverty is not available 
until 2001.  
 3
2. Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Literature 
The minimum wage as a poverty reducing tool is problematical for a number of 
reasons.  To begin with, it is difficult to predict the effect of the minimum wage on the 
wages and employment of workers to whom the law applies.  As Freeman (1996, p. 639) 
notes “The goal of the minimum wage is not, of course, to reduce employment, but to 
redistribute earnings to low-paid workers.” Yet, most of the literature has found negative 
employment effects (see Brown, 1999 and Neumark and Wascher, 2006 for reviews of 
the evidence).  There are a few studies using data from the US (Card and Krueger, 1994 
and 1995) and the UK (Machin and Manning, 1994) that have found no or positive 
employment effects.  If minimum wages have no disemployment effects, as the 
monopsonistic model predicts, then minimum wage increases will certainly raise the 
incomes of low wage workers.  However, if the labor market is competitive, some 
workers lose their jobs while others retain them at a higher wage. Moreover, if the 
elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector is high (greater than 1), minimum 
wages will reduce the share of total earnings to low-paid workers by displacing a larger 
number from employment than the number whose wages are raised by the minimum 
wage.3  Whether the displaced worker’s earnings fall below the per capita poverty level is 
of course a function of a number of variables including, the existence and generosity of 
the social safety net, the flexibility of the labor market, the demand for the workers’ 
skills, etc. There are, of course, other ways that workers covered by minimum wage 
legislation can gain or lose from increases in the minimum wage, including adjustments 
                                                 
3 See Neumark and Wascher (2002, pp. 316-318) for an extensive discussion of the assumed 
elasticities in the literature and the actual measured elasticities for affected workers. 
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in hours worked, reduction in non-wage benefits, and spillover effects.4  If workers above 
the minimum also gain from minimum wage increases, then there can be larger positive 
income effects on low-wage workers.5  
A second set of issues to consider is the indirect effect of minimum wage 
increases on workers not covered by minimum wages (or sectors where there is no 
compliance with minimum wage legislation).  Minimum wages can indirectly contribute 
to poverty creation in the uncovered sector if workers who lose their job in the covered 
sector greatly increase their labor supply to the uncovered sector, lowering wages below 
the per capita poverty line. In this two-sector competitive model of the labor market, the 
final effect on the uncovered sector will depend on the elasticities of labor demand and 
supply in both sectors.  However, if there are institutions, such as unions, which try to 
garner the level and increases in minimum wage in the uncovered sector, then reductions 
in poverty of families of workers in the uncovered sectors might be an outcome. 
In considering the potential for minimum wage policy to reduce poverty, we must 
recognize that poverty is a function of a worker’s family income, which raises a third set 
of issues: It requires addressing whether low-wage workers are in low-income families.  
Hikes in the minimum wage that raise the incomes of low-wage workers will only reduce 
poverty to the extent that those workers are in low-income families.  Gramlich (1976) 
was one of the first to note that minimum wage workers can live in relatively affluent 
families. More recently Burkhauser et al. (1996) showed that only one-third of the 
workers in the US affected by the 1990 minimum wage increase were in poor or near 
                                                 
4 See Brown (1999) for a full discussion of the many adjustments in the labor market that can 
result from an increase in the minimum wage. 
5 Fajnzylber (2001) and Maloney and Núñez (2003) have found large spillover effects in Latin 
American countries.  
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poor families. (Another third of the workers were in families with incomes more three 
times the poverty line.)  
A related issue is that the impact of minimum wages can have different effects on 
family income depending on who in the household is affected and how they respond.  For 
example, one could envision scenarios where increases in the minimum wage could bring 
a family out of poverty if a secondary earner decides to join the labor force because the 
wage increase is above her reservation wage (Addison and Blackburn, 1999; Freeman, 
1996).  However, an increase in the minimum wage might also cause a family to fall into 
poverty if it is the head of the household who looses his or her job as a result of the 
increase (and other members are not able to increase their hours of work or find a job if 
not working). Which workers gain and which loose can also influence whether the 
family’s income is above or below the poverty line. 
Finally, a fourth factor to consider is the relative level of the minimum wage to 
the per-capita poverty line.6  One might expect that raising the minimum wage could 
have a bigger effect reducing poverty if the minimum wage is set at or below the per-
capita poverty line than if it is set at four times the per capita poverty line.  However, the 
relative level of the minimum wage to the per-capita poverty line also reflects the 
government/society’s view as to whether the minimum wage is meant to cover the basic 
needs of a worker or a family.  It is also a function of the extent to which families are 
expected to rely on one vs. two bread-winners.  For example, if the society believes that 
the minimum wage should cover only the basic needs of a worker, a family of four with 
                                                 
6 See Fields and Kanbur (2006) for a theoretical treatment of the impact of minimum wages on 
poverty reduction which focuses on four parameters: the elasticity of labor demand, the ratio of 
the minimum wage to the poverty line, the extent of income sharing in the household and the 
degree of poverty aversion.  
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only one household member earning the minimum wage will be poor; raising the 
minimum wage in this scenario would have no impact on poverty reduction.  On the other 
hand, if the minimum wage is meant to meet the basic needs of a family, then raising the 
minimum wage in this scenario is more likely to reduce poverty. 
Because of all these factors, it is difficult to predict what the consequences of a 
minimum wage increase are for poverty and the distribution of family incomes.  We turn 
to the empirical literature on this question, which unfortunately is sparse in comparison to 
the literature on the wage and employment effects.  
Card and Krueger (1995) provide one of the first estimates of the effect of 
minimum wages on poverty in the US.  They regress the change in a state’s poverty rate 
from 1989 to 1991 on the fraction of the state’s workers that are “affected by” the 
minimum wage increase in 1990-1991 and provide some weak evidence (mostly 
insignificant) for a modest poverty reducing effect of the minimum wage.7  Addison and 
Blackburn (1999) also use state panel data and a methodology similar to Card and 
Krueger’s (1995), however they use a longer time frame (1983-1996) and focus on low 
wage families.  They find that increases in minimum wages reduce the poverty level 
among teenagers and junior high school dropouts.  However when they analyzed the 
relationship separately for the 1980s and 1900s, they found it is only statistically 
significant in the 1990s.8  Neumark and Wascher (2002) have recently contributed to the 
literature with a study that goes beyond estimating the net effects by measuring flows into 
and out of poverty.  They present evidence using US CPS data that increases in the 
                                                 
7 The ‘fraction affected’ was the share of workers whose wage was between the minimum wage 
in 1990 and the new minimum wage in 1991.  
8 Their search for explanations of the different outcomes in the 1980s and 1990s did not come up 
with anything conclusive. 
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minimum wage raises both the probability that some poor families escape poverty and the 
probability that some previously non-poor families fall into poverty. They conclude that 
the combined evidence indicates a redistribution of income among the poor rather than 
from the non-poor to the poor.  
Several studies have examined the effect of minimum wages on poverty in 
developing countries, mostly in Latin America.  Studies using aggregate country data 
tend to find minimum wage increases reduces poverty.  For example, Morely (1995), 
using data for Latin American countries, finds that poverty falls with an increase in the 
minimum wage during upswings in the business cycle by not during recessions.  Lustig 
and McLeod (1996) regress changes in poverty indicators (using alternative measures) in 
Latin American and Asian countries on their minimum wage changes (controlling for 
other variables associated with changes in poverty) and find higher minimum wages are 
associated with lower levels of poverty in both regions, whether the economy was 
growing or declining, and the population was urban or not.  However, they also find that 
minimum wage increases raise unemployment and hence they do not endorse minimum 
wages as an effective policy measurer to reduce poverty.  Saget (2001) uses data on a 
cross section of countries and finds a negative and significant relationship between the 
level of poverty (using a national poverty line) and the level of the minimum wage (in 
dollars), after controlling for the GDP/capita, average wage in manufacturing and 
location.  However, the results from a subset of countries where the regression could be 
run using the US$1 or US$2 a day international poverty line show no significant 
correlation.  Sagat (2001, p. 22) concludes that “This result confirms our intuition that 
 8
minimum wages in developing countries do not affect the poorest share of the population, 
but rather the upper levels of the low-income population.”  
Whereas the country-level studies in developing economies have a fairly 
consistent message, studies using micro data do not always find that poverty falls with a 
rise in the minimum wage. For example, IPEA’s (2000) simulations using Brazilian 
micro-data find that an increase in minimum wage has no effect on poverty, once the 
unemployment effects of the minimum wage increase are taken into account.  Arango and 
Pachon’s (2004) study, using Colombian panel data on urban areas, finds minimum 
wages improve the living conditions of families in the middle and upper part of the 
income distribution with net losses for those at the bottom.  They also find significant 
negative minimum wage effects on both the likelihood of being employed and hours 
worked, especially for women, the young and less educated workers.  On the other hand, 
Cunningham and Siga (2006) find that that minimum wages increases household earnings 
among the poor and that the poorest households experience the highest wage gains in 
Mexico.  The World Bank (2006) attributes the difference in Arango and Pachón’s (2004) 
and Cunnigham and Siga’s (2006) findings for Colombia and Mexico, respectively, to the 
fact that minimum wages are relatively low in Mexico and relatively high in Colombia.  
The Arango and Pachón (2004) and Neumark, Cunningham and Siga (2006) 
studies also begin to explore the impact of the minimum wage on the labor supply 
responses of different members of the household by examining separately the 
probabilities of employment and the change in the hours worked of the heads v. non-
heads of households.  Arango and Pachón (2004) find that an increase in the minimum 
wage relative to the median wage reduces the likelihood that a household head is 
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employed; this negative effect is larger for women and less educated people.  Although 
the findings for non-heads are not directly comparable to those for heads, since they are 
estimates of unemployment and participation in the labor force which are conditioned on 
the number of family members in the labor force, the authors claim that increases in the 
ratio of the minimum wage the median raises the probability of unemployment of non-
heads and also increases their probability of participation in the labor market, which the 
authors interpret as a “third-bread-giver response to negative family income shocks” (p. 
24). 
Hence the sparse literature on minimum wages and poverty has provided 
inconclusive evidence on the question of the impact of increases in the minimum wage on 
the level of poverty.  Most of the evidence is of reduced form with estimates of the 
correlation between (changes in) poverty and (changes in) the minimum wage. The older 
studies, using country level data, were more likely to find a negative relationship between 
minimum wage hikes and poverty than the more recent studies based on micro data.  
Some recent students are beginning to look more at the structural relationships and 
providing us with a richer understanding of the household responses to minimum wage 
increases.  
3. Minimum Wages and Poverty in Honduras 
During the period under study, Honduras set 22 minimum wages -- for small (1-
15 employees) and large (16+ employees) firms in eleven industries -- and adjusted them 
about two times a year.9 These minima applied to all salaried employees in the private 
                                                 
9 The information on the structure of minimum wages was gathered from interviews with staff at 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in Honduras and from a report by the Secretaria de 
Trabajo y Seguridad Social (2003). 
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sector; hence the public sector and the self-employed are the “uncovered sector.”10 
Appendix Table A1 summarizes the data on minimum wages from the decrees that we 
use in our analysis. These are daily minimum wages deflated to December 1999 prices 
using the monthly Consumer Price Index provided by the Bank of Honduras.  In our 
empirical work we use all 22 minimum wage categories.  We note that the minimum 
wage for large firms was on average 27% higher than the minimum for small firms 
during this period and that the rate of growth of real minimum wages was more rapid for 
small firms (4% per year) than for large firms (1% per year).  Hence over the period, 
minimum wages for small firms rose by 11.9% while for large firms they only rose by 
3.3%.   
The second data set we use is the Permanent Household Surveys for Multiple 
Purposes (PHSMP), which is a nationally representative survey that was carried out two 
times a year (in May and September) during 2001-2004. These surveys provide 
information on the economic activity, firm size and location of each person’s job, which 
allowed us to append to each worker and each unemployed person who has worked 
before the minimum wage that corresponds to his/her job in a given month and year.11  
                                                 
10 A separate wage grid applies to public sector employees who are not covered by union 
agreements.  Among the unionized civil servants, there are two groups (medical staff and 
teachers) whose base wage has at times been adjusted with a formula tied to minimum wage 
adjustments. 
11 Unfortunately, we are not able to assign a minimum wage to those outside of the labor force or 
to unemployed workers who have never worked before because we do not know the firm size and 
industry of their job; the applicable minimum wage depends on these two characteristics of the 
job.  However, since the unemployed who worked before are on average over three-quarters 
(76%) of all unemployed during the period under study, our results represent the vast majority of 
the unemployed.  
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The daily minimum wages were converted into monthly and hourly minimums in order to 
have them in the same units as the salary data in the PHSMP.12   
In order to get a sense of the variation in the real minimum wage over time in 
relation to the real wage, we plot in the first graph (upper left quadrant) of Figure 1 the 
average real minimum wages and wages (in Lempiras, December 1999 prices) of all 
private sector employees for each survey date during 2001-2004.13  The average real 
hourly minimum wage increased by 3.8% per annum on average or 10.9% from May 
2001 to May 2004.14  We also see that the minimum wage is relatively high -- between 
about 0.45 and 0.56 of the average wage -- during 2001-2004. 
The graphs in the lower half of Figure 1 are presented to show that Honduras was 
enjoying a period of relatively stability and growth after the destruction created by 
Hurricane Mitch in 1999.  Inflation ranged between 6.0% and 9.6% and GDP was 
growing at an average annual rate of about 4.3%, without any significant shocks.   
Honduras is a relatively poor country.  With a GNI per capita of US$1,040 in 
2004 (World Bank Indicators), it is the fourth poorest country in Central America (but 
                                                 
12 According to the Directorate of Salaries in the Ministry of Labor, employers are required to pay 
30 daily MWs in a month. We calculated an hourly minimum wage = Monthly MW/(4.3 x 44), 
which assumes an average of 4.3 weeks a month and that full time work is 44 hours a week. (In 
Honduras, full-time work for private sector employees is defined in the labor code as 8 hours a 
day for five days plus one half-day on Saturday.) The hourly wage was calculated by dividing the 
monthly salary (provided in the PHSMP) by the number of hours the worker indicated he/she had 
worked per week times 4.3 (weeks/month). (Observations with missing data on any of the key 
variables -- labor earnings, hours worked, sector, etc. -- were deleted.) 
13 These minimum wages are averaged over all private sector employees, hence over large and 
small firms and over the 10 industries in the PHSMP. 
14 However, the annual increases in the average real minimum wage are more erratic and very 
different when using May to May annual changes (15.1% increase between 2001 and 2002; a 
5.9% decline in 2002-2003; and a 2.3% rise in 2003-2004) than when using the September to 
September annual changes (0 changes between 2001 and 2002 and 6.5% increase between 2002 
and 2003).  This is of a function primarily of when the minimum wage was last raised and how 
much inflation there was in the interim, and to a lesser extent to changes in the distribution of 
workers across industry and firms size.  
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very close to Nicaragua, the poorest country). It has the highest poverty headcount ratio 
in the region, which has remained fairly constant since 1990 (Trejos and Gindling, 2004).  
Since 2001, micro data have been available on two levels of poverty -- poverty and 
extreme poverty -- from the household surveys (PHSMPs).  The extremely poor poverty 
line is constructed from the cost of a basic basket of foodstuff yielding 1,200 calories a 
day.  A household is considered extremely poor if its per capita earnings are less than the 
cost of this basic basket of food. The poverty line is constructed from a basic basket of 
goods that includes housing and education services in addition to the basic basket of 
food.  
To get a sense of the levels poverty and its trend in Honduras, we present in the 
upper right quadrant of Figure 1 a bar graph with the shares of the labor force which fall 
in each of three categories – extremely poor, poor and non poor – at each of the survey 
dates from 2001 to 2004.  The average shares, over the entire period, are in the bottom 
row of Table 1.  As can be seen, a very large percentage of the labor force in Honduras -- 
on average 44% -- is considered extremely poor, with 63% (an additional 19%) 
considered poor, leaving only about 37% of the work force as non-poor.  The bar charts 
in Figure 1 indicate that over these four years, these shares are fairly constant, with only 
small fluctuations around the mean.   
We also show in Table 1 the unconditional probability that different groups of 
individuals in the labor force are poor.  The rates of extreme poverty are highest among 
those working in small firms, 46%, or self-employed, 51% (which together account for 
almost three-quarters of the labor force); workers and unemployed who are unskilled, 
49% (two-thirds of the labor force); young people between 15 and 21 years of age, 50% 
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(which account for one-quarter of the labor force); and individuals living in rural areas, 
62% (almost half of the labor force).  Although these patterns are typical, the gap 
between the urban and rural extreme poverty rates is remarkably large in Honduras.  We 
note that the measure we present here is comparable but not equivalent to the poverty 
head count measure, which measures the share of the population below the poverty line.   
How high is the minimum wage relative to the household per capita poverty line?  
At 3.5 times the poverty line, the World Bank (2006) ranks Honduras’ ratio of the 
minimum wage to the per capita poverty line as third out of 20 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, with Guyana being the highest (6.5 times the poverty line) and Chile 
the second highest (at about 3.8 times the poverty line).  We noted earlier that if the 
minimum wage is set high relative to the poverty line, then raising it may have no impact 
because it is raising the income of the middle (a bit like the findings of Arango and 
Pachón, 2006, for Colombia).  In Honduras a minimum wage earner could provide a 
household with three dependents with the basic needs above the poverty. However, in a 
country where the female labor force participation rate is low and the average family size 
is large, this minimum would not necessarily cover the basic needs of the typical family 
of five if there were only one income earner.  Hence, there is scope for a reduction in 
poverty from raising the minimum.15  
Finally, we noted that in the US literature there is a concern that individuals who 
earn the minimum wage are not in poor households.  Hence we calculate the share of 
workers who earn within 10 percent of the minimum wage (i.e., 0.9MW<W<1.1MW) 
that are poor.  We note from Table 2 that 71% of all workers who earn the minimum 
                                                 
15 The World Bank (2006) study notes that at $7/day the Honduran poverty line is also far above 
the $2/day poverty line and that three countries (Venezuela, Mexico and Uruguay) out of twenty 
Latin American and Caribbean countries have minimum wages that are below this poverty line.  
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wage are in poor households, which indicates that raising the minimum wage could have 
a substantial effect on poverty.16  We list the probabilities for various groups in the 
population and see that raising the minimum wage for household heads, unskilled, men 
and older individuals could potentially lift more families out of poverty than raising it for 
the non-heads, skilled, women and younger people.   
4. The Impact of the Minimum Wage on the Distribution of Wages  
A straightforward method of looking for an impact of minimum wages is to look 
for spikes in the wage distribution at or around the minimum wage (e.g., Dinardo, Fortin 
and Lemieux, 1996).  However, given the number of minimum wages in Honduras, we 
simplify the graphical analysis by plotting the kernel density estimate of the log wage 
minus log minimum wage for each worker, where a zero indicates that the worker is 
earning the legal minimum wage.  In Figure 2 we plot these kernel density estimates 
separately for four sectors: two covered (the large firm and the small firm sectors) and 
two sectors not formally covered by minimum wage legislation (self-employed and the 
public sector).  If legal minimum wages are enforced in a particular sector, we would 
expect to see the distribution of wages censored from below at the level of the minimum 
wage, with no (or very few) workers earning below the minimum wage.  We might also 
expect to see a density at zero (at the minimum wage) to be higher in the covered sector 
than in the uncovered sector.  This is what we find in the kernel density estimates in the 
top left panel of Figure 2 for covered workers in large firms:  there is a large spike at the 
minimum wage and there is a clear censoring of the distribution below the minimum 
wage.  On the other hand, the distribution of wages in the small firm covered sector is not 
                                                 
16 We note from Table 1 that the average individual in the labor force has a .63 probability of 
being poor in Honduras, and the probability is higher for those earning the minimum wage.  
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censored and there is no spike at the minimum.  The shape of the distribution of wages in 
the small firm covered sector is more similar to the shape of the distribution in the 
uncovered self employed and public sectors.  In these three sectors, there is no indication 
that minimum wages affects the distribution of wages, and therefore we conclude that 
minimum wages are not effectively enforced in the small firm covered sector, self-
employed sector or public sector. 
Another way to summarize the information presented in Figure 2 is to calculate 
the average share of workers earning less than, at, or more than the MW within each of 
these four sectors, as we do in Table 3.17  We find the share at the MW is substantially 
higher among private sector employees in large firms (12.4%) than among private sector 
employees in small firms (9.7%), among the self employed (7.1%) or in the public sector 
(5.3%), again pointing to higher enforcement in the large firm private sector.  Similarly, 
we find relatively fewer workers earn less than 90% of the minimum wage in the large 
firm covered sector (16.9%) than in the small firm private sectors (39.8%). Additionally, 
we find no evidence that minimum wages directly affect the distribution of wages in the 
self-employed or public sector.  Hence the combined evidence of the wage distribution 
and the average share earning below and at the minimum wage point to better 
enforcement of minimum wages in the large firm covered sector than in small firms, 
where we might conjecture there is little to no enforcement.   
In a companion paper (Gindling and Terrell, 2006) we use an industry-level panel 
data set to estimate the wage and employment effects of changing minimum wages in 
Honduras.  In that paper we find that increases in the minimum wage are correlated with 
                                                 
17 We use a bound of 10% to allow for measurement error so that we are actually measuring the 
share earning less than 0.9 of the MW, within 0.9 and 1.1 of the MW and more than 1.1 of the 
MW. 
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higher average wages in the large firm covered sector (our estimates suggest that a 10% 
increase in legal minimum wages will increase average wages in the large covered sector 
by 2.1%).  At the same time, higher minimum wages reduce employment in the large 
firm covered sector (we estimate that an increase in real minimum wages of 10% reduces 
employment by 5.3%).  Where do the workers who lose their jobs in the large firm 
covered sector go?  Our evidence suggests that they enter the small firm covered sector 
and unemployment.  As workers pushed out of the large firm covered sector by higher 
minimum wages enter the small firm covered sector, they drive down average wages in 
that sector. Our estimates suggest that a 10% increase in legal minimum wages will 
increase employment by 4.3% and reduce wages by 1.9% in the small firm covered 
sector.  We find no significant wage and employment effects on self-employed workers 
or on workers in the public sector suggesting that minimum wages are not affecting these 
workers indirectly either through public sector wage setting or shifts in the supply of 
labor.  
5.  Econometric Methodology and Findings  
Our goal is to estimate the extent to which an increase in minimum wages 
increases/decreases the probability that a person in the labor force (with particular 
characteristics) will be poor or extremely poor.  We begin by estimating the following 
equation with a probit model using individual-level data on members of the labor force 
(employed plus unemployed who worked before) using a pooled data set of all seven 
surveys from 2001 to 2004:18 
                                                 
18 The data in the regression are weighted by sample weights. Estimated standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation as well as corrected for the clustering of errors around 
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where Poor, equals 1 if the worker is living in a poor (or extremely poor) family.  The 
explanatory variable of interest is lnMWit, the log of the real hourly minimum wage (in 
1999 Lempiras) that applies to that firm size and industry at time t.  The coefficient α1 is 
an estimate of the effect of one percent increase in legal minimum wage on the probability 
an individual in the labor force is poor.  The vector Xit, controls for other factors that 
explain low wages and poverty (education, age, age squared, family size, dummy 
variables for rural/urban location and gender).  We include fixed effects for the month 
and date of the survey, YRt, to control for changes in the survey design and any time-
specific factors such as aggregate supply and aggregate demand changes or changes in 
the timing of the surveys.  We also include 22 industry/firm-size dummies (INDit) to 
control for industry/firm-size specific fixed effects and for the endogenous correlation of 
employment and minimum wages across industry categories.  
Because we find that minimum wages are only complied with in large firms, we 
also estimate separate coefficients for the effects on individuals in large v. small firms 
(covered sector) as well as for individuals the two uncovered sectors – self-employed and 
public sector workers.   
The coefficients on the minimum wage (α1) presented in Table 4 indicate that a 
10% increase in the minimum wage will lower the probability that a person in the labor 
force is extremely poor by 2% and may lower the probability that a person in the labor 
force is poor by 1%, although this second coefficient is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  The findings in the next rows demonstrate clearly that the negative 
relationship between changes in minimum wages and poverty is being driven entirely by 
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the higher wages in the large firm sector as the coefficients on all other sectors are 
insignificant.  Hence workers who are in the large firm sector gain from a minimum wage 
increase in terms of some leaving poverty.  Workers in the small scale sector are not 
made worse off – in terms of poverty – by minimum wage hikes but, as we found in 
Gindling and Terrell (2006), their wages are lowered in this sector as it absorbs some as 
of workers that lose their jobs in the large firm sector. 
We next ask to whether the findings in the first row of Table 4 hold more strongly 
for low paid workers than for high paid workers. Hence, in separate probit regressions we 
interact the minimum wage variable in equation (1) with a dummy variable for different 
characteristics of workers that signal low v. higher pay: i.e., unskilled (people with up to 
an elementary school education) v. skilled (with more than an elementary school 
education); heads v. non-heads of households; urban v. rural; male v. female; and 
younger (15 to 21 years of age) v. older (21+ years) individuals. The estimated 
coefficients from these interacted variables are shown in Table 5; they indicate that in 
almost all cases, the relationship between increases in the minimum wage and poverty 
reduction is stronger among the lower paid workers (unskilled, rural, female and young) 
than among their higher paid counterparts.  For example a 10 % increase in the minimum 
wage reduces the probability that a woman is extremely poor by 3.3% and poor by 2.3% 
whereas the point estimates for men are much smaller and not statistically significant. 
This would lower the incidence of extreme poverty among women from 33.9% to 33.1% 
and their incidence of poverty from 21.4% to 20.7%.  The one case where this does not 
hold is with heads and non-heads of households.  The evidence presented in Table 5 
suggests that hikes in the minimum wages lowers the probability that the head of a 
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household is poor by more than it lowers the probability that the non-head of a household 
is poor. This is important because the proportion of working household heads that are 
poor is a stronger indicator of the proportion of families who are poor.  These results 
suggest that minimum wages in Honduras are correlated with a bigger reduction in 
families in poverty than the results for individual workers (from Table 4) would suggest. 
In Table 6 we address the question of whether this minimum wage/poverty 
relationship, which we learned in Table 4, is being driven by changes in the large scale 
sector more than the small scale sector, continues to hold for workers with low pay more 
than for workers with higher pay in large v. small firms.  The findings in Table 6 show 
that indeed, the coefficients for small firms are nearly all insignificant whereas for large 
firms they are nearly all significant.  Within large firms, the estimates indicate that 
minimum wages have a larger impact on poverty among the unskilled relative to the 
skilled, the old relative to the young, and especially in the rural areas relative to the urban 
areas.  Their impact on poverty reduction is not significantly different among heads v. 
non-heads of households and between men and women in the large firm sector.    
7.  Conclusions  
We conclude from these findings that increases in the minimum had a modest 
poverty reducing effect in Honduras during 2001-2004:  A 10% increase in the minimum 
wage is associated with a 1.8% fall in extreme poverty and a 1.0% decline in poverty 
among all individuals in the labor force.  Checking this with the historical record, we note 
that minimum wages in Honduras rose by 10.9% over this period; and extreme poverty 
fell from 46.8% to 42.1%, which is more than 2% decline predicted by our model, 
indicating additional factors are at play in reducing poverty. The impact of minimum 
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wages on poverty reduction is driven by one sector where minimum wages are enforced -
- i.e., the large firm sector -- where only 20% of the labor force is located. We find no 
indirect (significantly negative or positive) effects on the small firm sector (where 
minimum wages should apply but are not enforced) or the two uncovered sectors (self-
employed and public sector).  Closer inspection of the relative effects on lower paid v. 
higher paid workers indicates that the poverty reduction effects tend to be larger among 
the unskilled and especially the rural areas, which experience the largest poverty 
reduction impact. (A 10% increase in the minimum wage lowers extreme poverty by 
4.4% and poverty by another 4.1% in rural areas).  We find, contrary to findings by Sagat 
(2001) and Arango and Pachón (2006), that Honduras’ minimum wage impacts extreme 
poverty as well as poverty in spite of a relatively high minimum wage (in terms of the 
poverty line or average wage). 
We stress that these findings are reduced form estimates of the net impact of 
minimum wages on poverty.  A more thorough analysis using panel data on individuals 
(which is not available in Honduras) would estimate a structural/dynamic model of the 
channels driving these net effects on poverty reduction.  
We noted at the outset that questions are being raised with respect to the role of 
minimum wages in a fiercely competitive global economy.  Some argue that they impede 
employment creation, especially of “good” jobs (Heckman and Pages, 2001; Pages and 
Micco, 2006) while others argue that minimum wages can shift the composition of 
employment toward “good jobs” (Acemoglu, 2001).  We have shown in companion 
studies that minimum wage legislation can reduce the number of good jobs in the 
formal/regulated sectors and increase the number of jobs in the informal/unregulated 
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sector in Honduras (Gindling and Terrell, 2006) and Costa Rica (Gindling and Terrell, 
2007).  Moreover, increases in the minimum wages lower the wages of employees in the 
small firm sector in Honduras.  However, we have shown in this paper that the impact of 
increased minimum wages on poverty in the small sector is not significant (although the 
coefficient is estimated with a positive sign).  These combined findings imply that 
someone in the household of the individual working in the small firm sector had to 
increase his/her labor supply in response to the minimum wage increase in order to keep 
the family out of poverty.  This can be interpreted as a reduction in the household’s 
welfare if not an increase in its poverty.  If the increased supply of labor is from a child 
that should be in school, then there are implications for long-term poverty among the next 
generation. 
In an era of globalization, the extent to which countries are competitive is an 
important consideration.  However, one would hope that governments could help protect 
their workers from fierce competition (the “race to the bottom”) by creating an 
environment that enables good job creation and poverty reduction while at the same time 
not hampering and hopefully enhancing firms’ competitiveness.  This is a difficult 
challenge.  In that context, however, there is the argument that raising minimum wages 
will force employers to consider investing in capital and other complementary factors that 
increase a worker’s productivity when they might not have otherwise.  Hence increased 
minimum wages may stimulate employers to seek ways to increase their efficiency and 
remain competitive in the global economy.  This is an area that needs further study with 
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Area Extremely Poor Poor Non-Poor
Share of 
Total
Covered Large 19.0 24.7 56.2 20.3%
Covered Small 46.4 19.9 33.7 36.3%
Self-employed 51.1 17.8 31.1 36.2%
Public 9.8 18.9 71.4 7.2%
Unskilled* 49.3 20.5 30.2 67.6%
Skilled** 14.5 21.1 64.4 32.4%
Non-Head 41.2 20.1 38.7 56.6%
Head 41.1 19.9 39.0 43.4%
Rural 62.0 9.9 28.1 48.3%
Urban 27.1 27.4 45.5 51.7%
Female 33.9 21.4 44.8 35.8%
Male 45.2 19.3 35.5 64.2%
Young (15-21) 50.4 19.5 30.0 24.4%
Older (21+) 38.2 20.2 41.6 75.6%
All Workers + 
Unemp. 44.0 18.9 37.1 100.0%
*Unskilled are individuals primary or less education.
**Skilled are individuals with some secondary or higher education.
Source: Authors calculations from the Honduran Household Surveys.
Table 1: Poverty Rates for Different types of Workers in 
Honduras (avg. for 2001-2004)











Table 2: Percent of Workers who Earn 
Within 10% of the Minimum Wage that 
are Poor (average over 2001-2004)
Source: Authors calculations from the Honduran 
Household Surveys.
Less Than1 At2 More Than3
Total 32.4% 9.3% 58.2%
Private Salaried Employees  
    Large 16.9% 12.4% 70.7%
    Small 39.8% 9.7% 50.4%
Self-Employed 43.2% 7.1% 49.7%
Public 6.0% 5.3% 88.7%
1Less than 90% of the Minimum Wage
3110% or more than the Minimum Wage
Source: Authors calculations from the Honduran Household Surveys.
Table 3: Share of Workers Earning Less than, At, and More than the Minimum 
Wage by Sector (Average for 1990-2004)
2Within 10% of the Minimum Wage
Sample Poor Extremely Poor 
All Workes plus -0.103 -0.184**
Unemployed 0.074 0.084
Covered Large -0.191** -0.195***
0.081 0.055






*significant at the 0.10 confidence level
**significant at the 0.05 confidence level
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level
 
Table 4: Impact of an Increase in the Minimum Wage on the 
Poor and the Extremely Poor: All Workers Plus Unemployed 
and by Large and Small Firms1
1Cofficients on the log of the Minimum Wage estimated with the a probit as 
specified in Equation (1) in the text. 
Notes: Standard errors, in italics, are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation as well as corrected for the clustering of errors around minimum wage 
categories in each year.

















young (15-21) -0.161* -0.231**
0.093 0.099
older (21+) -0.082 -0.170**
0.073 0.082
*significant at the 0.10 confidence level
**significant at the 0.05 confidence level
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level
Table 5: Impact of an Increase in the Minimum Wage on the 
Poor and the Extremely Poor for Sub-Groups n the Labor 
Force1
Notes: Standard errors, in italics, are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation as well as corrected for the clustering of errors around minimum wage 
categories in each year.
1Cofficients on the log of the Minimum Wage estimated with the a probit as 
specified in Equation (1) in the text. 
Sample Poor Extremely Poor Poor Extremely Poor 
Unskilled -0.373*** -0.279*** 0.612 0.263
 0.104 0.073 0.532 0.414
 
Skilled -0.009 -0.001 0.76 0.456
0.120 0.096 0.553 0.486
 
Non-head -0.134* -0.170*** 0.511 0.108
0.078 0.054 0.441 0.394
Head -0.219*** -0.205*** 0.468 0.058
0.076 0.059 0.441 0.393
rural -0.512*** -0.381*** -0.068 -0.156
 0.134 0.094 0.427 0.351
urban -0.015 -0.063 0.592 0.189
0.072 0.049 0.401 0.383
female -0.166 -.277** 1.054** 0.687
0.114 0.112 0.512 0.547
male -0.197** -0.187*** 0.319 -0.058
0.084 0.051 0.419 0.345
young -0.125 0.080 0.662 0.103
0.149 0.102 0.486 0.550
old -0.159** -0.208*** 0.47 0.098
0.080 0.056 0.435 0.414
*significant at the 0.10 confidence level
**significant at the 0.05 confidence level
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level
Table 6: Impact of an Increase in the Minimum Wage on the Poor and the 
Extremely Poo for Sub-Groups in the Labor Force in Small and Large Firms1
1Cofficients on the log of the Minimum Wage estimated with the a probit as specified in Equation 
(1) in the text. 
Notes: Standard errors, in italics, are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation as well 
as corrected for the clustering of errors around minimum wage categories in each year.
Large Firms Small Firms
Figure 1:  Macroeconomic Indicators for Honduras 
Source: Author's calculations from the Honduran Household Surveys Source: Author's calculations from the Honduran Household Surveys






























































             Figure 2:  Kernel Density Distribution of the Log Wage Minus the Log Minimum Wage in Each Sector  
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Table A1: Real Daily Minimum Wage (Dec. 1999 Monthly Prices)
Sector May_01 Sept_01 May_02 Sept_02 March_03 Sept_2003 May_2004
Agriculture, Hunting and Fishing
1 -15 workers 34.60 33.73 35.25 32.83 36.82 35.85 37.91
16+ workers 48.62 47.39 49.47 46.08 50.30 48.97 50.45
 
Non-Metalic Mining 60.55 59.02 61.03 56.85 61.97 60.34 62.16
Metalic Mining
1 -15 workers 36.33 35.41 38.72 36.07 40.44 44.06 41.65
16+ workers 50.35 49.07 52.71 49.10 53.46 56.74 53.64
Manufacturing
1 -15 workers 36.33 35.41 38.72 36.07 40.44 39.37 41.65
16+ workers 50.35 49.07 52.71 49.10 53.46 52.05 53.64
Utilities 54.76 53.37 61.03 56.85 61.97 60.34 62.16
Construction
1 -15 workers 36.33 35.41 38.72 36.07 40.44 39.37 41.65
16+ workers 50.35 49.07 52.71 49.10 53.46 52.05 53.64
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants
1 -15 workers 36.33 35.41 38.72 36.07 40.44 39.37 41.65
16+ workers 50.35 49.07 52.71 49.10 53.46 52.05 53.64
Transptn., Storage and Comm.
1 -15 workers 41.09 40.05 44.06 41.04 46.54 45.31 47.40
16+ workers 52.08 50.76 51.09 47.59 51.88 50.51 52.04
Financial Services
1 -15 workers 54.76 53.37 61.03 56.85 61.97 60.34 62.16
16+ workers 60.55 59.02 61.03 56.85 61.97 60.34 62.16
Real Estate
1 -15 workers 41.09 40.05 44.06 41.04 46.01 45.31 47.40
16+ workers 52.08 50.76 51.09 47.59 51.88 50.51 52.04
Business Services
1 -15 workers 41.09 40.05 44.06 41.04 41.04 39.96 37.77
16+ workers 52.08 50.76 51.09 47.59 47.59 46.33 43.80
Communal Services
1 -15 workers 36.33 35.41 38.72 36.07 40.44 39.37 41.65
16+ workers 50.35 49.07 52.71 49.10 53.46 52.05 53.64
